We compile a new database of grocery prices in Argentina, with over 9 million observations per day. We ind uniform pricing both within and across regions-i.e., product prices almost do not vary within stores of a chain. Uniform pricing implies that prices would not change with regional conditions or shocks, particularly so if chains operate in several regions. We conirm this hypothesis using employment data. While prices in stores of chains operating almost exclusively in one region do react to changes in regional employment, stores of chains that operate in many regions do not seem to react to local labor market conditions. We study the impact of uniform pricing on estimates of local and aggregate consumption elasticities in a tractable two-region model in which irms have to set the same price in all regions. he estimated model predicts an almost one-third larger elasticity of consumption to a regional than an aggregate income shock because prices adjust more in response to aggregate shocks. his result highlights that some caution may be necessary when using regional shocks to estimate aggregate elasticities, particularly when the relevant prices are set uniformly across regions. JEL Classiications: D40, E30, L10, R10.
Introduction
here is a growing and inluential literature that uses regional variation to identify local elasticities (e.g., Mian and Sui, 2011; Autor, Dorn, and Hanson, 2013) , and then uses these local elasticities to understand the aggregate economy. We argue, however, that the presence of irms in multiple regions has important implications on how to use the regional variation to make inference about aggregate elasticities. In this paper we make three main contributions to understand what the presence of multi-region irms implies for macroeconomics. First, we introduce novel data from Argentina and show that there is uniformpricing: multi-region chains tend to set the same prices across stores both within and across regions. Second, we show that prices tend to react relatively litle to local conditions, particularly so for irms that operate in multiple regions. Finally, we build a model to understand the macroeconomic implications of uniform pricing. Our key inding is that consumption aggregate elasticities (i.e., to aggregate shocks) tend to be smaller than local elasticities (i.e., to local shocks), as prices react more to aggregate conditions when prices are set uniformly across regions. his result highlights that some caution may be necessary when using regional shocks to estimate aggregate elasticities, particularly when the relevant prices are set uniformly across regions.
Most empirical analysis about micro-price statistics use scanner price data from developed countries with low inlation. One contribution is the creation of a new database for daily posted grocery store prices in Argentina in a high-inlation context. Since May 2016, every day, stores have to report their ofline prices (i.e., prices in the store) to the Argentinean government. he data is processed and posted online in an oicial price-comparison website, with the objective of providing information to consumers. We have about 9 million price observations per day, totaling about 5 billion observations, which allows us to have a large panel on chains, stores, products, and prices. Having daily posted prices is crucial for our objective of studying pricing strategies since we do not rely on average prices nor do we need to aggregate time periods (as in scanner data).
Our irst empirical inding, using our new data, is that there is uniform pricing-i.e., conditional on a product, there is litle variation in prices across stores of the same chain. here are three pieces of evidence consistent with this fact. First, even though chains have on average over 100 stores across the country, we ind that, on average, there are less than 4 unique prices for each product-chain group. Second, price changes are also consistent with uniform pricing. Focusing on products that change prices in one store, we compute the probability that other stores change the prices of the same products on the same day. he probability is 5% for stores of any chain, but it increases to almost 30% when we focus on stores of the same chain. 1 hird, using a variance decomposition methodology, we ind that around two-thirds of the relative price dispersion can be explained by chain-product ixed efects. 2 Hence, only 1 one-third of the price variation can be explained by stores seting diferent prices within a chain.
Our second empirical inding is that prices tend to react relatively litle to local conditions, particularly so for irms that operate in multiple regions. We use employment data at the province level as a proxy of local conditions. We ind that prices in stores of chains operating almost exclusively in one region do react to local conditions, while stores of chains that operate in many regions do not seem to react to local labor market conditions. his result suggests that prices would not change with regional conditions or shocks, particularly so if chains operate in several regions (e.g., national chains or e-commerce) which can be important for the use of local elasticity estimates to predict aggregate elasticities.
Our third contribution is the study of the macroeconomic implications of uniform pricing for the efects of regional relative to aggregate income shocks. We develop a model with the fewest possible components such that it is both tractable as well as consistent with the data. We extend the standard model of monopolistically competitive irms with a continuum of goods in three key dimensions. First, we add non-homothetic preferences so income shocks can afect prices. We assume preferences similar to Simonovska (2015) , as this preference structure allows for analytical tractability. Second, we include multiple regions and variation in market shares across varieties. We assume there are two regions with heterogeneous preferences across varieties, which generates variation on market shares. hird, motivated by our indings, each irm has to set a single price in both regions. We estimate the model to match the fact that irms operating mostly in one region react more to local shocks. Uniform pricing implies that consumption reacts less in response to an aggregate than to a regional income shock because prices adjust more in response to aggregate shocks. he estimated model predicts an almost one-third larger elasticity of consumption to a regional income shock than to an aggregate one. We show that this result is robust to several robustness extensions such as considering alternative city conigurations and extending the model to general equilibrium. his result highlights that some caution may be necessary when using regional shocks to estimate aggregate elasticities, particularly when the relevant prices are set uniformly across regions. he rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the literature. Section 3 introduces our novel price dataset and provides basic descriptive statistics. Section 4 provides our main empirical results regarding uniform pricing. he model and the implications of uniform pricing for consumers and irms are presented in Sections 5 and 6. Finally, Section 7 concludes. he Appendices contain additional details on the data and model.
Related Literature
his paper is related to several strands of the literature related to price-seting behavior and its macroeconomic consequences. First, there is an empirical literature on gathering new data on retail prices in developing countries. Cavallo and Rigobon (2016) provide a summary of this new research agenda. he novelty of our paper is that we obtain information on oline prices (i.e., prices in the store) instead of online prices as in previous research. Since February 2016, the Argentinean government has created a daily, national, publicly available report of prices (Sistema Electronico de Publicidad de Precios Argentinos). To the best of our knowledge, we are the irst to collect and analyze this data. Alvarez, Beraja, Gonzalez-Rozada, and Neumeyer (2018) also study micro-price statistics for Argentina, but for a diferent period (1988 to 1997) and with a smaller sample. 3 Diferent from previous research, we have larger cross-sectional variation in stores and products, which allows us to control for observable characteristics and uncover novel empirical facts. For example, in Alvarez, Beraja, Gonzalez-Rozada, and Neumeyer (2018) the average number of observations per month is about 81,000, whereas we have about 9 million observations per day. Similarly, they have information on 500 products, whereas we have four times as many products in our inal sample selection. 4 his paper is also part of a growing literature that studies price dispersion and uniform pricing. Kaplan, Menzio, Rudanko, and Trachter (2019) ind that, in the US, most of the price dispersion is across stores that are equally expensive but set diferent relative prices. We show that this is true also in our data but argue that in fact most of the variation is at the chain rather than store level due to uniform pricing. Empirical studies ind that many store characteristics are explained by chains. For example, Hwang, Bronnenberg, and homadsen (2010) ind that assortment gets set at the chain level, and Hwang and homadsen (2016) ind that a large fraction of the variation of brand sales across stores is also explained at the chain level. 5 We extend this evidence, showing that prices also seem to be deined at the chain level. Price variation between grocery stores of the same chain is relatively small. Using US data, Nakamura, Nakamura, and Nakamura (2011), DellaVigna and Gentzkow (2019) and Adams and Williams (2019) also show that uniform pricing strategies are common in the US. 6 Previous papers, however, used scanner price data, which has the disadvantages of being at weekly frequency and of using transaction prices that mix temporary sales with list prices. A distinct feature of our data is that we observe daily list posted prices, which allow us to get a more precise measure of uniform pricing.
Our main contribution, however, is the study of the macroeconomic implications of uniform pricing. We study the impact of regional shocks on irms with diferent shares of local stores, with the novel inding that under uniform pricing and multi-region irms, consumption elasticities to local shocks tend to be larger than to aggregate shocks since prices adjust more with aggregate shocks. his result relates to the literature that compares local and aggregate iscal multipliers. Nakamura and Steinsson (2014) ind that uniform monetary and tax policies (across a nation) imply that local government expenditure multipliers will be larger than an aggregate multiplier-since the later would lead to larger monetary and tax adjustments. Dupor and Guerrero (2017) highlight other potential sources of spillovers as movements in factors of production and trade in goods, among others. Diferently from Nakamura and Steinsson (2014), Dupor and Guerrero (2017) ind small spillovers, hence suggesting that diferences between local and aggregate multipliers are not large. In line with our results, Beraja, Hurst, and Ospina (2016) also provide indirect evidence that local prices may not signiicantly react to local employment conditions, since they estimate the impact of state-level employment growth on state-level wages to be almost equal when using either real or nominal wages. Finally, also in line with our indings, Baker, Johnson, and Kueng (2017) ind that prices at wholesale irms (which tend to be larger and more geographically spread) react much less to local sales tax changes than prices at retail irms (which tend to be smaller and more local). 7 To the best of our knowledge, however, we are the irst to highlight that uniform pricing has important implications for the growing literature that estimates various elasticities with respect to regional shocks (e.g., Mian and Sui, 2011; Sui, Mian, and Rao, 2013; Dupor and Guerrero, 2017; Beraja, Hurst, and Ospina, 2016; Yagan, 2018; Sergeyev and Mehrotra, 2018; Stroebel and Vavra, 2019) . Uniform pricing strategies in an economy with multi-region irms implies that elasticities to local shocks are likely to be biased estimates of elasticities to aggregate shocks.
Data
In February 2016, the Argentinean government passed a normative to build a national, publicly available report of prices (Sistema Electronico de Publicidad de Precios Argentinos). he objective of the policy was to reduce inlation by providing information on prices. All large retailers of massively consumed goods have to report daily prices to the government for each of their stores. he requirement was mandatory for a large set of products (typically associated with grocery stores), but retailers were allowed to include non-mandatory products as well. Large ines (of up to 3 million US dollars) are to be applied if stores do not report their prices correctly. Since May 2016, the oicial website www.preciosclaros.gob.
ar has provided consumer-friendly access to this price information. On this website, ater entering their location, consumers can search for stores and products and compare current prices. his website only contains information about the prices in the stores; i.e., consumers cannot buy online from this website.
In this paper, we use data from May 2016 to March 2018. 8 We obtain information on each store and product. For each store, we know its name (not just an identiication code), its chain owner, the type of store, and its precise location (latitude and longitude). Chains may have diferent types of stores based on size or known under diferent names in the market. We do not know whether these diferent types of stores operate as diferent chains, so in some of our analysis we deine "chains" as "chain-types". For each product (bar code), we know its name, category, and brand. Categories are composed of three levels, with the third level being the most disaggregated. For example, the irst-level categories include personal care and non-alcoholic drinks. he second level of the personal care category includes the hair care and oral care categories. Finally, the third level of the hair care category includes the shampoos and conditioners categories.
he prices posted on the website are the prices of products available at each (oline) store. Given that some products have special sales, we sometimes have several prices for a good in a particular store on a given day. In such cases, we know all available prices. Some of these sales are available only to some consumers-typically a percentage discount for customers with a particular credit card or membership. Some of these sales, however, also refer to discounts available to all consumers-for example, two for the price of one. In addition to the mandatory list price, each store can report one of each of these two types of sale prices. Because we can diferentiate these two types of sales, we end up with a maximum of three prices per product-store-day. 9 Overall, we have daily data on approximately 9 million productstore observations across the country.
Our dataset has advantages and disadvantages relative to more common scanner price data. here are two main disadvantages. We do not observe prices for grocery stores that are not part of large companies (i.e., those with annual sales over approximately 50 million US dollars). According to survey information available for 2012-2013 (Encuesta Nacional de Gastos de Hogares), our data should include between 50 and 85% of grocery sales in Argentina. For that time period, grocery sales corresponded to approximately 33% of households' expenditures. More importantly, we do not have purchase quantities or individual product weights. herefore, our empirical analysis assigns equal weight to each productstore included in the analysis.
Balancing these disadvantages, this data has several advantages. First, scanner price data is not easily available in developing countries, so our data helps ill this gap. Also, because Argentina is a highinlation (about 30% in 2016) country, it provides an interesting scenario. Moreover, having daily (instead of weekly or monthly) price data for all products (not just the ones being sold or bought) is an advantage. Knowing each store's chain provides us with new information that has not been widely exploited before. Similarly, our data has precise location information on each store (not just zip codes), so it potentially allows us to create interesting measures of distance to competition, among others. Finally, we are able to identify both the list price and (possibly many) sales prices, which can be important when describing retailers' pricing strategies. Figure 1 shows all the stores included in the data. Given that most stores are concentrated in the Buenos Aires area, the two botom igures show in more detail Greater Buenos Aires (GBA) and Buenos Aires City (CABA). 10 We irst describe prices in a particular local market, CABA, and then study the pricing evidence from all stores in Argentina. 11 he data includes 2313 stores of 22 chains, with around 50 thousand products. his implies about 9 millions product-store observations per day for 584 days, totaling about 5 billion observations. In order to study price dispersion, we limit our atention to products that are widely sold, as is common in the literature (e.g., Kaplan, Menzio, Rudanko, and Trachter, 2019) . In particular, we clean the data such that we keep products that are sold by at least two chains and present in more than 50% of stores in a given region (i.e., either CABA or Argentina). We also focus on products that are sold most of the time (i.e., we focus on product-store combinations present in over 50% of the weeks). We also drop products in the price-control program Precios Cuidados, as there is no dispersion on these prices. 12 Table 1 shows some descriptive statistics for the data before and ater cleaning, for CABA and Argentina. he data cleaning process does not eliminate any store. Even though it does reduce the number of products studied by around 90-95%, the number of observations is reduced by only two-thirds. he products kept are the ones more common across stores and hence have a larger number of observations. 13 he number of stores per product increases by around 500%, hence allowing us to have enough information to describe price dispersion. Finally, the average prices of the products are around 25% lower in the selected sample. More importantly, the average price dispersion-the cross-sectional standard deviation of the prices at which the same product is sold on the same day and in the same region-in the initial and inal samples remains almost constant. 10 Argentina has a population of approximately 44 million people. GBA and CABA account for approximately one-third and one-tenth of the country's population, respectively. he areas of GBA and CABA are 3,830 and 203 km 2 , respectively. As a reference, CABA is about twice as large as Manhatan, both in population and area. 11 Results are robust to choosing other cities (e.g., Cordoba). 12 he program Precios Cuidados consists of price controls for about 300 products. See Aparicio and Cavallo (2018) for a study of this program. 13 It is also possible that some observations have misreported information, which implies that prices are less likely to be common across stores. hese observations would also be eliminated. Notes: Each dot refers to a store in the given region. Notes: Price dispersion refers to the average standard deviation of log-standardized prices. his measure is explained in detail in the main text.
Descriptive Statistics
Finally, we use the stores' locations to include two additional data sources. First, we use the the 2010 Census to incorporate characteristics such as education and employment of each store's location. Second, we use oicial data on regional employment to study the response of prices to local shocks. 14
Empirical Results
In this section we study the role of chains (as opposed to stores) on prices. Recent literature has highlighted that price dispersion is a prevalent characteristic in many markets: he same product (deined by the UPC bar code) is sold at diferent prices by various stores in a local market and time period. We also ind large variation in relative prices between chains. We ind, however, that conditional on a product, there is litle variation across stores of the same chain. We use the term "uniform pricing" to refer to this fact, i.e., that product prices do not vary within stores of a chain. he geographic boundary of a chain is not obvious, so we perform our analysis both using only Buenos Aires city data and using all Argentinean data. In both cases, we show that prices as well as price changes are remarkably similar for all stores within a chain.
We then introduce information on the characteristics of store locations and explore which chain characteristics correlate more with uniform pricing. Even though chains that operate in many provinces tend to display less uniform pricing, we ind that the relationship is not strong, particularly when chains are deined in a stricter way (i.e., according to chain-types). Chains may use subdivisions within the chain 14 Employment data is available at www.trabajo.gob.ar/estadisticas/oede/ estadisticasregionales.asp.
(which are ixed across time) to partially discriminate prices, but it seems that, once that is done, price diferentiation between locations is not particularly strong.
One potential implication of uniform pricing is that grocery store prices would not change with regional conditions or shocks, particularly so if chains operate in several regions. We explore this hypothesis and show that prices in stores of chains that operate in many regions do not seem to react to local labor market conditions, while stores of chains operating almost exclusively in one region do react to local conditions.
Uniform Pricing
CABA has 806 grocery stores that belong to ive diferent chains. he number of stores per chain varies between 17 and 340. he sizes of the stores, measured by the number of products sold, also vary between approximately 1,200 and 1,800. To obtain some intuition about prices within chains, we irst use a case study of a particular product (a speciic carbonated soda identiied by the UPC code) on a particular day (December 1st, 2016) . Figure 2 shows the distribution of prices for this product, with diferent colors identifying each chain's distribution. Prices are bunched in only a few values and, more importantly, conditional on a chain, there are only a few prices (much fewer prices than the number of stores). 15 Price Notes: Each color refers to a diferent chain. Data for a particular product (UPC code) and date (December 1, 2016).
More formally, Table 2 shows that uniform pricing is a general characteristic of chains in CABA. For each day-product-store observation, we deine the relative price as the log-price minus the mean logprice across stores for the same day-product. Product prices are almost unique within chains. he 15 Appendix Figure A2 repeats this exercise for other products. 9 average number of unique prices for each good across stores is between 1 and 4.5 for all chains. Given the number of stores per chain, this implies one price per 55 stores on average. Chains have up to 4 types of stores, and part of the price dispersion within chains is explained by price diferences between store types. he average number of unique prices by chain-type is always under 3, implying one price per 81 stores. Moreover, price dispersion in CABA is 7% (see Table 1 ), while price dispersion within chains is smaller, between 0.7% and 4.7%. If we further control for store type within chains, the price dispersion is even smaller.
he last panel of Table 2 refers to the average price of each chain. he relative price of a store is deined as the average relative price across products in the store for a given day. he relative price of the chain is deined as the average across time and stores of these daily relative prices. Chain I is in general the cheapest, with a relative price 3.3% lower than the average. his contrasts signiicantly with the Chain V relative price, which is 3.2% higher than the average. his ranking, however, hides signiicant variation across products. For example, the cheapest chain sets 5% of their prices 4.3% above the market average. Similarly, the most expensive chain sets 5% of their prices 10.6% below the market average. Notes: Price dispersion refers to the average standard deviation of log-standardized prices. his measure is explained in detail in the main text. Table 3 expands this analysis to all chains and stores in Argentina, showing that product prices are almost unique within chains not only in CABA but also within chains in Argentina. In order to un- Unique prices by product 1.01 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.11 3.73 1.00 9.08 1.00 3.44 1.13 2.26 2.09 5.40 15.29 18.25 1.37 6.68 Price dispersion by chain-province Unique prices by product 1.01 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.10 2.72 1.00 2.10 1.00 2.74 1.13 1.40 1.10 3.22
3.52 5.36 1.37 2.35
Price dispersion by chain-province-type Unique prices by product 1.01 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.09 2.72 1.00 Notes: Price dispersion refers to the average standard deviation of log-standardized prices. his measure is explained in detail in the main text.
derstand the magnitude, we highlight that the average number of stores per chain is over 100. he geographic boundary of a chain is not clear, so we remark that for most multi-province chains the average number of unique prices is much smaller if we compute unique prices by chain-province. 16 Notes: Statistics are in daily frequency. For example, 2.72% of prices are changed everyday in CABA. "Price changes by store" refers to the share of prices that were changed by stores that changed the price of at least one product.
Price Changes: Table 4 studies the intensive and extensive margins of price changes in CABA and Argentina, highlighting the large synchronization in price changes across stores of the same chain. Around 2.8% of prices are changed every day, with approximately two-third price increases and onethird price decreases. Midrigan (2011) highlights that price changes tend to occur at similar times for products of the same category in the US. his is also true in our data. Among products that change prices in CABA, only 13% of other stores in any chain change prices. For products that change prices, we observe that around 27% of other products in the same level-three category (the most narrowly deined) change prices in the same store. We notice, however, that price-change coordination seems stronger across chains than categories. Among products that change prices, we observe that 30-37% of other stores in the same chain change the price of the same product on the same day. he standard deviation of these price changes is approximately one-sixth of the unconditional standard deviation of price changes. Moreover, if we focus only on stores of the same type (for CABA) or in same province (for Argentina) within the same chain, the share of stores that change prices increases to over 60%, with an even smaller dispersion of changes. his evidence suggests that chains coordinate their price changes across stores.
Variance Decomposition: In Appendix B we introduce a statistical model to perform a variance decomposition of prices and formally highlight the role of chains in pricing. he basic statistical model proposes that the log-price p д,s,c , of good д in store s of chain c can be summarized by a product ixedefect α д , a chain ixed-efect β c , a chain-product ixed-efect γ д,c , and a residual ϵ д,s,c . he variation in ϵ д,s,c comes from diferent stores of the same chain seting diferent prices for the same product:
Under some assumptions speciied in Appendix B that allow us to simplify the estimation (which is important given the size of our sample), we can decompose relative price variation in a chain component, a chain-product component, and the residual:
. Figure 3 shows that in CABA, 17% of the price variation is driven by some chains being generally more expensive than others. Once we control for average prices of products by chain, 73% (17% + 56%) of the price dispersion is explained. Using all the data from Argentina, we ind that average chain prices per product explain 62% (11% + 51%) of price variation. A simple extension to the statistical model allows us to study the role of province variation. Controlling for price diferences across provinces by chain explains another 19%. In other words, consistent with Table 2 and 3, price variation across stores within chains is small, driving only 27% and 19% of the total relative price dispersion for CABA and Argentina, respectively. 17 
Correlation with Chain Characteristics
We merge information on the location of stores with 2010 Census data to describe the characteristics of each chain's locations. We use the most precise deinition of a location in the Census data (i.e., departamentos, partidos or comunas, depending on the region), with a total of 528 locations. hese locations are generally large, on average 7,300km 2 in size with a population of 79,000 people. he median location in which stores are located, however, is smaller in size and more densely populated (186 km 2 with 190,000 people). 18 More importantly, we are able to obtain information on the education, employment, and home characteristics of the people living in those areas. Table 5 performs a simple OLS regression of uniform pricing (measured using the standard deviation of relative prices within each chain) on diferent chain characteristics. he standard deviation of relative prices increases with the number of stores, but this becomes insigniicant once we control for the number of provinces in which a chain operates. he number of types of stores is also correlated with the amount of price dispersion, diminishing the explanatory power of the number of provinces. One potential hypothesis is that chains with greater variance in store-location characteristics will have higher incentives to set diferent prices. We ind that the standard deviation of relative prices does increase with variance in store-location characteristics (either education or distance to competition) but, once again, becomes insigniicant once we control for the number of types of stores and number of provinces in which a chain operates. he let panel of Figure 4 plots the relation between uniform pricing and the number of provinces in which a chain operates. he relation is positive but relatively lat. he number of stores, shown by the size of each circle, does not seem to afect the standard deviation of relative prices. he right panel of Figure 4 plots the same relation but deines chains in a stricter way, i.e., according to chain-types. In this case, the relation between uniform pricing and the number of provinces is even weaker, suggesting that chains may use subdivisions within the chain to partially discriminate prices. Once that is done, price diferentiation between locations is not as strong. Store locations are not exogenous, so we might expect that chains tend to operate stores in locations with similar characteristics (e.g., for reputation or customer demand reasons). To study this hypothesis, we compute the variance of the log of alternative characteristics for locations in which a chain operates relative to the unconditional variance. Table 6 shows that the averages across chains for alternative characteristics (e.g., education, number of children, or age of the head of household) are always under one-half, conirming that chains locate their stores in relatively similar places.
Efects of Regional Shocks
We have reported consistent evidence that irms' pricing decisions almost do not vary with store characteristics; that is, most chains tend to have a single price per product across their stores. One potential implication of this fact is that grocery store pricing will not change with local conditions or shocks.
In this section we introduce evidence on monthly employment levels for each province to evaluate whether average store prices luctuate with local labor market conditions. 19
Given the evidence presented on uniform pricing, we expect that prices in stores of chains that operate in many regions will not react to local labor market conditions, while stores of chains operating almost exclusively in one region will react to local conditions. For each store s we deine three measures. First, for prices, let ∆p s,t be the annual change in the average relative price in store s and month t. Second, we measure the relative importance of a province for a chain by the local share. Let c(s) refer to the chain of store s and prov(s) the province of store s. We deine the chain's local share local s,t as the share of stores of chain c(s) that belong to province prov(s) in month t. More formally, 19 We would like to have more precise deinitions of labor market conditions, but we are limited by data availability.
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where N prov(s) c(s)
is the number of stores of chain c (s) in province prov(s) and month t, while N c(s),t is the total number of stores of chain c (s) in month t. hird, for local conditions, let ∆e prov(s),t be the annual change in log employment in the province prov(s) of store s in month t. Table 7 evaluates how ∆p s,t relates to ∆e prov(s),t and, more importantly, how that relation depends on the local share local s,t .
he irst column of Table 7 shows that average-price growth per store is not signiicantly related to employment growth. In all our analysis, we control for store ixed efects in order to control for trends in either store or local characteristics. Once we split the sample by local share, however, columns (2) and (3) show that the relation is signiicantly positive for stores with a local share above the median (i.e., above one-third approximately) but not for those below.
Next, we do a more formal analysis of the role of the local share by including the interaction between local s,t and ∆e prov(s),t . We estimate ∆p s,t = α s + γ t + δ local s,t + ρ ∆e prov(s),t + β local s,t × ∆e prov(s),t + ϵ s,t .
he coeicient of interest is the interaction term β . Columns (4) and (5) show that the interaction term is signiicant and positive, even ater controlling for time ixed efects. Figure 5 plots the marginal efect of employment growth ∆e prov(s),t on store price growth ∆p s,t for stores with diferent levels of local shares local s,t , showing that prices in stores with larger local shares covary more with local conditions. his means that a 1 percent change in employment growth (∆e prov(s),t ) implies a 0.5 percent change in prices (∆p s,t ) for chains with a local share of 100%, but almost no change for chains with a local share below 25%. Notes: his igure reports the marginal efect of employment growth on price growth for diferent levels of a chain's local share, as obtained from Column (4) in Table 7 . he vertical lines refer to the 95% conidence intervals.
Model
We build and estimate a tractable model consistent with the empirical indings of uniform pricing. We use the model to study how prices and consumption have diferent responses to regional than aggregate shocks. he model has the fewest possible components such that while it is consistent with the data it is also tractable, allowing us to easily identify the key trade-ofs across alternative pricing schemes. We extend the standard model of monopolistically competitive irms with a continuum of goods in three key dimensions. First, we add non-homothetic preferences so that prices change with income shocks. We assume preferences similar to Simonovska (2015), as this preference structure allows for analytical tractability. Second, we include multiple regions and variation in market shares across varieties. We assume there are two regions with heterogeneous preferences across varieties to generate variation on market shares. hird, we assume that there is uniform pricing, i.e., the seller has to set the same price in both markets. We describe the main ingredients of the model and relegate the solution details to Appendix C.
Time is discrete and ininite, t = 0, . . . , ∞. here are two cities j = 1, 2 with population size M j and a continuum of diferentiated goods ω ∈ [0, 1]. Each product is sold by a national monopolistic irm that chooses to sell in either one or both cities. hroughout the analysis, we interpret City 1 as the local economy and City 2 as the rest of the economy. Section 6.4 shows that the results are robust to extending the analysis to a general equilibrium framework.
Households
here is a representative consumer in each city with period utility
where Ω j,t is the set of goods consumed in city j and period t, q j,t (ω) is the individual consumption of variety ω in city j and period t, andq j > 0 is a city-speciic constant. here are city-speciic tastes, s j (ω), such that the demand functions are heterogeneous across goods and cities. Without loss of generality we assume that ∂s 1 (ω) ∂ω ≥ 0 and ∂s 2 (ω) ∂ω ≤ 0 . hus, consumers in City 1 prefer goods closer to ω = 1, while those in City 2 prefer goods closer to ω = 0.
Preferences are non-homothetic, so the demand elasticity changes with income, as in Simonovska (2015). With these preferences the model can be consistent with the empirical indings in Section 4, which show that prices change with income shocks. 20 Moreover, the presence of heterogeneous tastes and non-homotheticity implies that in equilibrium some goods are sold only in City 1, some goods only in City 2, and some in both cities. his characterization is important to capture the empirical inding that some chains are national (i.e., sell in many cities), while others are local (sell only in one city) and can have diferent responses to regional or aggregate shocks. he household's problem reads
he demand for variety ω in city j and period t is given by
whereS j,t = ∫ ω∈Ω j,t s j (ω) dω, and P j,t = ∫ ω∈Ω j,t p j,t (ω) dω. he marginal utility from consuming a variety ω is bounded from above at any level of consumption. Hence, a consumer may not have positive demand for all varieties.
Firms
Firms have a linear technology with marginal cost c j,t . We compare the solution of two alternative price setings: uniform and lexible pricing. Under uniform pricing, the irm has to set the same price in both cities; i.e., p 1,t (ω) = p 2,t (ω) = p t (ω). Alternatively, under lexible pricing, producers can set diferent prices in each city.
Flexible Pricing
In the case of lexible pricing, irms can set diferent prices in each city. he problem of the irm is
taking the demand function (2) as given. he solution is
Given the demand function (2) and pricing (3), we can ind the set of goods consumed in each city. It is easy to show that this set is characterized by a threshold such that q j,t (ω) ≥ 0 if and only if s j (ω) ≥ s j,t . 21 he threshold is deined as the taste such that consumption is equal to zero; that is, s j,t ≡ S j,t q j c j,t w j,t + P j,t q j .
(4)
Recall that s 1 (ω) is increasing in ω. Hence, there exists ω t ∈ [0, 1] such that q 1,t (ω) ≥ 0 if and only if ω ≥ ω t and ω t = s 1 ( 
Uniform Pricing
Under uniform pricing, each variety ω has the same price in both cities. herefore, each seller has to choose whether to sell only in City 1, only in City 2, or in both locations. If the seller chooses to sell only in one location, the price function is the same as with lexible pricing. If he sells in both locations, the problem is
taking the demand functions (2) as given. he solution is
To solve for the set of goods consumed in each city, note that prices are increasing in the taste preference s j regardless of whether a variety is sold in either one or both cities. his implies that in equilibrium there are thresholds s j,t such that in city j the consumption of variety ω is positive if and only if s j (ω) ≥ s j,t . Moreover, s 1 (ω) increasing implies that there exists ω t such that Ω 1,t = [
. Similarly, as s 2 (ω) is decreasing, then Ω 2,t = [0, ω t ]. As a result, the price of variety ω is
Finally, the thresholds are deined by
uantitative Exploration
In this section we quantitatively evaluate the implications of uniform versus lexible pricing.
Calibration
We calibrate the model with uniform pricing in steady state, assuming that City 1 is a representative province of our data and City 2 is the rest of the country. To measure the relative size of a representative province, we use information on the number of stores by provinces. We estimate that the average share of stores that a chain has in a province is 20%. We interpret this as M 1 = 0.2 and M 2 = 0.8 since those estimates relect the relative size of the diferent markets available to a typical chain. We further assume consumers in each city are symmetric, so we set y 1 = y 2 = 1 andq =q 1 =q 2 , and without loss of generality we normalize c 1 = c 2 = 1. Moreover, we set the taste parameters s 1 (ω) = (ω) α and s 2 (ω) = (1 − ω) α . In Section 6.3 we evaluate the role of some of these assumptions in our results.
We calibrate the two preference parameters α andq targeting three moments from the empirical results. First, in the data, on average, 7% of stores that sell in a province sell only in that province. In the model, City 1 consumes varieties Ω 1 = [ω, 1] out of which varieties [ω, 1] are sold only in City 1. Hence, we target this moment as (1 − ω) / (1 − ω) = 0.07.
Section 4.3 shows that prices of irms with a lower local share react less to regional shocks. In the model we deine the local share as local (ω) = M 1 q 1 (ω) / (M 1 q 1 (ω) + M 2 q 2 (ω)). 22 We shock the economy with an exogenous increase in income for City 1-we increase y 1 by 1.7%, which corresponds to one standard deviation in the data. We target the response of irms with local shares of 0.5 and 1. Despite its simplicity, the model does a good job at matching the three target moments. Table 8 shows the estimated parameters and target moments. Validation: We validate the calibration looking at the distribution of local shares, which is a nontargeted moment. Figure 6 shows the distributions of local shares in the model and in the data. he model does a relatively good job in replicating the distribution of local shares given its simplicity. he model under-predicts the number of stores with relatively small local shares (those that operate in many regions). Given that our main result is driven by the relative importance of chains with small local shares, the fact that our calibrated model underestimates the relative importance of these stores will imply that our results will likely lie on the conservative side (i.e., providing a lower bound of the bias of local elasticities when used to estimate aggregate ones). Response to regional shocks: In the calibration we target the response of prices to regional shocks for irms with a local share of 50% or 100%. We now compare the response for uniform versus lexible pricing. he irst panel of Figure 7 shows the responses of prices to income shocks as a function of the local share. In the economy with lexible pricing, the response of prices is equal to 0.47 for all products regardless of the local share. In the uniform pricing economy, irms have to set the same prices across cities. Hence, when the local share is relatively small, the total demand for that product does not change much. As a result, prices have a small reaction to income shocks. On the other hand, when the local share is high, prices react more to income shocks in City 1. he paterns of price reactions in the uniform-pricing economy resemble the empirical indings of Figure 5 , while those in the lexible-pricing model do not. 
Individual deviation Flexible pricing equilibrium
Notes: he irst igure shows the response of prices to regional shocks in City 1. We shock the economy with an exogenous increase in income for City 1; we increase L 1 by 1.7%, which corresponds to 1 standard deviation in the data. he second igure shows the change in proits when the economy moves from uniform to lexible pricing.
Uniform versus lexible pricing: We model uniform pricing as an exogenous constraint to the irm for tractability. We can quantify how costly this constraint is by comparing the proits of irms in this economy with irms in the lexible-pricing economy. he second panel of Figure 7 shows the change in proits when we move from the uniform to the lexible pricing economy. First, the blue solid line shows the change in proits for an individual deviation of only a speciic variety ω. In this case the irm can only be beter of. Note that for varieties close to ω = 0 and ω = 1 the gains are almost zero. Similarly, at ω = 0.5 the demand elasticities are equivalent in City 1 and 2 and, therefore, there are no gains for irms. he red doted line shows the change in proits when all irms move to the lexible-pricing equilibrium and so the demand functions also change. In this case there are some winners, those close to the thresholds ω and ω because for those irms the constraint is more costly, while there are some losers, those away from the thresholds. On average, however, the increase in proits is only about 0.35%.
Aggregate Shocks
We study the responses of prices and consumption to aggregate versus regional income shocks. We deine total consumption in city j as Q jt = ∫ 1 0 q jt (ω) dω and a price index P index j,t such that P index j,t Q jt = ∫ 1 and note that ε P,j + ε Q,j = 1. With lexible pricing, regional and aggregate shocks have similar efects on prices and quantities. Table 9 shows that the elasticity of prices and consumption are 0.46 and 0.53, respectively, regardless of the type of shock being regional or aggregate.
Under uniform pricing, however, regional and aggregate shocks have diferent efects. An aggregate shock has almost the same efect as in the lexible-pricing economy. A regional shock, however, has a lower efect on prices and a larger efect on quantities in the uniform-pricing economy. he intuition is that under uniform pricing prices are set accordingly to the total demand of the aggregate economy. If there is a regional shock, the aggregate demand will not change much, and, as a result, prices will be sticky to regional shocks. Consumption, therefore, will react more in the region of the shock than under an aggregate shock in which prices do adjust more. Table 9 shows that when household income increases only in City 1, prices increase by 0.28, while prices increase by 0.44 for an aggregate shock. hus, consumption increases by 0.71 from a regional shock, while it increases only by 0.55 from an aggregate shock. he estimated model predicts an almost one-third larger elasticity of consumption to a regional income shock than to an aggregate one. his result implies that using regional heterogeneity to infer aggregate elasticities may lead to an upward-bias due to uniform pricing. Notes: he table compares the elasticity of the price index and quantities consumed to regional and aggregate shocks in City 1, in the uniform-and lexible-pricing economies. We deine the elasticity ratio as elasticity to regional relative to aggregate shocks.
Alternative City Conigurations
We consider alternative setups to study the quantitative importance of each assumption. We evaluate the efects of city sizes, income, and preferences. We ind that the ampliication of the response of consumption to regional relative to aggregate shocks is robust to all the alternative speciications.
City Sizes: As City 1 becomes larger, prices will follow more the demand of City 1 and the response of regional and aggregate shocks will become more similar. Figure 8 shows the ratio of the elasticity of consumption to a regional relative to an aggregate shock. In the limit, when M 1 = 1 and M 2 = 0, the ratio is equal to 1. However, the igure shows that for a wide range of values the ratio is between 1.2 and 1.4 and when M 1 is suiciently small the ratio can be as high as 1.6. We model the economy as two regions, while in the real world there are many regions, so each city looks like a small region. Hence, this exercise shows that the results would likely be stronger in a larger model that takes geographical heterogeneity into account.
Heterogeneous Income: When City 1 becomes richer the elasticity ratio increases. We vary y 1 , which proxy for the income in City 1. he intuition is that under uniform pricing, the seller takes the demand in the richer city more into account and therefore react less to shocks in the poor city. Hence, prices react more to regional shocks in richer than in poorer cities, which decreases the elasticity ratio.
Preference Heterogeneity: When both cities have more similar preferences (lower α), the elasticity ratio increases. he intuition is that for products close to ω = 1 (those with higher preference in region one), the demand from City 1 increases when α decreases. Hence, the prices of those goods will react less to a regional shock, which increases the elasticity ratio. Notes: he igures show the change in the ratio of the elasticity of consumption to regional relative to aggregate shocks under alternative parameter conigurations.
General Equilibrium
We extend the model to general equilibrium and ind a similar ampliication of elasticities as in the model in partial equilibrium. We assume that there are local labor markets in each city and the representative consumer is the owner of local proits.
he representative household of city j solves
where L S j,t is the labor supply. he representative household in city j is the owner of Π j,t ; i.e., irms' proits in city j are
where z j is the labor productivity.
he demand for variety ω and labor supply are
whereλ j,t is the Lagrange multiplier of the budget constraint.
Firms have a similar problem to the model in partial equilibrium but with the corresponding demand functions from general equilibrium. Labor demand is
and the wage w j,t clears the labor market.
Results: We set the Frisch elasticity of labor supply 1/γ to 1 (as in Kaplan, Moll, and Violante 2018 or Blundell, Pistaferri, and Saporta-Eksten 2016) and calibrate the preference parametersq, α, and ζ to match the same target moments as in the previous calibration and target hours worked to one-third. 23 Table 10 shows the elasticities of prices and consumption to regional and aggregate shocks. Similar to the partial equilibrium model, with lexible pricing, regional and aggregate shocks have similar efects on prices and quantities. Under uniform pricing, regional and aggregate shocks have diferent efects, as in the partial equilibrium models. he magnitudes of the elasticities are similar in the partial and general equilibrium model. Both models predict an almost one-third larger elasticity of consumption to a regional income shock than to an aggregate one. Notes: he table compare the elasticity of the price index and quantities consumed to regional and aggregate shocks in City 1, in the uniform-and lexible-pricing economies.
Conclusion
his paper introduces a new database of grocery prices in Argentina, with over 9 million observations per day, to study the importance of chains relative to stores in seting prices. We show that conditional on a product, there is litle variation across stores of the same chain; i.e., there is uniform pricing. Prices almost do not vary within stores of a chain and prices do not change signiicantly with regional conditions or shocks, particularly so for chains that operate in many regions.
We study the impact of uniform pricing on estimates of local and aggregate elasticities. We develop a tractable two-region model in which irms have to set the same price in all regions. We estimate the model to match the fact that irms operating mostly in one region react more to local shocks. Uniform pricing implies that consumption reacts less in response to an aggregate than to a regional income shock because prices adjust more in response to aggregate shocks. he estimated model predicts an almost one-third larger elasticity of consumption to a regional income shock than to an aggregate one. We show that this result is robust to several robustness extensions such as considering alternative city conigurations and extending the model to general equilibrium. his result highlights that some caution may be necessary when using regional shocks to estimate aggregate elasticities, particularly when the relevant prices are set uniformly across regions. Moreover, the recent rise in market-share concentration and of e-commerce (to about 10% and 15% of all retail sales in the US and worldwide, respectively, in 2018) implies that irms are more likely to be active in multiple regions, which reinforces the importance of this channel.
Why would irms set uniform prices instead of customizing prices to local customers? Traditional explanations typically focus on the cost of discriminating, including operation as well as reputation costs. Dobson and Waterson (2008) provide a diferent reason more closely related to collusion. hey show that irms may be beter of under uniform pricing even if they have larger market power in some regions. his policy, if applied by all irms under commitment, will soten competition in other markets and may suiciently raise irm proits overall (at the cost of some local proits). Our paper does not explore this question. Instead, using the model, we take uniform pricing as an exogenous constraint and evaluate its consequences for consumers and irms. We highlight, nevertheless, that the returns to price discrimination for irms in our baseline estimation are low, less than 0.35% of proits on average. Hence, we interpret this to mean that the costs of price discrimination may not need to be as large as one may imagine to justify uniform pricing.
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A Data Appendix A.1 Website Example Figure A1 shows an example in which we use the website to search for Coca-Cola soda. he second igure shows that ater searching for Coca-Cola, many varieties of the product are available. he prices in the nearby stores are reported. Ater selecting one particular product (e.g., Gaseosa Coca-Cola X 2,25Lt), we obtain the list of stores and their prices. Note that these prices include list and sale prices.
33 Figure A1 : Precios Claros Website
Step 1: Introduce Location
Step 2: Search for Product
Step 3: Select Product Notes: We show here an example in which the website is used to search for Coca Cola soda. he last igure shows (a subset of) the diferent stores and prices (including sales) available nearby. 
A.2 Data Validation
he data is self-reported by the chains, but we have several motives to believe that it actually represents the real prices. First, large ines (of up to 3 million US dollars) are applied if stores do not report their prices correctly. Second, micro-price statistics are consistent with the international evidence for countries with annual inlation around 30%. For example, the monthly frequency of price changes is 0.84 and the dispersion of relative prices is 9.7%, both of which are similar to the indings in Alvarez, Beraja, Gonzalez-Rozada, and Neumeyer (2018) . hird, we observe a (small) variation in prices for a speciic product (UPC code) across stores of the same chain and chain type, implying that retailers are not uploading exactly the same price list for all their stores. Fourth, the number of stores by province is consistent with oicial statistics (see Encuesta de Supermercados). Finally, the level of price changes is consistent with oicial statistics for monthly inlation. his evidence lead us to believe that the selfreported prices are the real ones and there are no mistakes in the database.
B Statistical Model of Price Dispersion
We use a statistical model to do a variance decomposition of prices and formally highlight the role of chains behind price seting. We implement this analysis separately for each day, so the variation studied here is not related to prices changing over time-and we do not need to control for time factors. We then report average results over time as well as the autocorrelation of the diferent estimated components.
We propose that the log-price p д,s,c of good д in store s of chain c can be summarized by a product ixedefect α д , a chain ixed-efect β c , a chain-product ixed-efect γ д,c , and a residual ϵ д,s,c . he variation in ϵ д,s,c comes from diferent stores of the same chain seting diferent prices for the same product: p д,s,c = α д + β c + γ д,c + ϵ д,s,c .
In our estimation, we assume that the conditional mean E [ β c + α д |д ] = 0, such that α д absorbs the average price efect. his standardizes prices, facilitating the comparison of prices of diferent goods that may be more expensive due to their characteristics (e.g., a 2.25 liter botle of a particular soda vs a 750 milliliter botle of a shampoo). 24 We also assume that E [ γ д,c |c ] = 0, such that β c absorbs the average chain efect. his controls for some chains being on average more expensive, possibly due to their particular amenities. hese assumptions simplify the estimation, which is particularly important given the size of our sample, and guarantee that the covariance terms are zero. he estimation of α д , β c , and γ д,c can be done by conditional sample means: 24 his is equivalent to analyzing "relative prices, " as in Kaplan, Menzio, Rudanko, and Trachter (2019) .
where (with a slight abuse of notation) N д refers to the number of stores selling good д, N c the number of price observations (i.e., good-stores observations) of chain c, and N д,c the number of stores selling good д in chain c.
We then abstract from the price variation due to product characteristics α д and study dispersion in relative prices. We decompose relative price variation in a chain component, a chain-product component, and the residual:
. Figure 3 in the main text shows that in CABA 17% of price variation is driven by some chains being generally more expensive than others. Once we control for average prices of products by chains, 73% (17% + 56%) of price dispersion is explained. For the Argentinean case, we also estimate the importance of prices in chains at the province-product level. In this case, average chain prices per product explain 62% (11% + 51%) of price variation. Controlling for price diferences across provinces by chain explains another 19%. In other words, consistent with Tables 2 and 3, price variation across stores within chains is small, driving only 27% and 19% of the total relative price dispersion for CABA and Argentina, respectively.
Alvarez, Beraja, Gonzalez-Rozada, and Neumeyer (2018) estimate price dispersion in Argentina using a longer time series of price data, from 1988 to 1997, covering a range of monthly inlation between 0 and 200%. hey have, however, only 500 products that cannot be precisely compared across stores (since products are deined as narrow categories and don't have bar codes). Our dataset contains a substantially larger number of goods that can be precisely compared across stores since we observe their UPC bar codes. Our estimates for the standard deviation of relative prices is approximately 7% and 10% for CABA and Argentina, respectively. hese estimates are near but below the estimates reported by Alvarez, Beraja, Gonzalez-Rozada, and Neumeyer (2018) in periods with inlation levels close to the ones from our time period. One potential explanation for this diference is that we are actually comparing the same products (UPC bar codes) across stores, while they may be comparing diferent products.
Autocorrelation: Understanding the origin of this price dispersion is important to understanding store price seting as well as consumer choices. Kaplan, Menzio, Rudanko, and Trachter (2019) highlight that a large share of price dispersion comes from each store selling diferent sets of goods cheaper while charging similar prices on average. his situation suggests that an information problem might make consumers buy in a store selling more goods at higher prices since it is costly (or not possible) to ind lower prices. If chains are the only drivers of price dispersion, the information problem seems more limited, as long as price diferences between chains are persistent. Figure B3 shows the autocorrelation of the estimated componentsβ c ,γ д,c , andε д,s,c at diferent lags of days. Table B1 shows the role of goods categories and store provinces on the variance of relative prices for Argentina. Regarding categories, 51% of the variance is explained by chains seting diferent relative prices across goods. Variation across categories explain 16% of the variance, while variation within goods of the same category explains the remaining 35%. Moreover, 38% of the variance of relative prices is explained by stores of the same chain seting diferent prices for the same good. he province of the store explains 19% of that variance, while the other 19% corresponds to diferent prices in stores of the same province. Finally, Table B2 shows that 19% of the variance of relative prices is explained by stores seting diferent prices across goods. Chains explain 11% of that variance, and diferent prices at stores of the same chain explain the additional 8%. 
C Model Appendix
In this appendix we derive the solution of the model. 
ii. In j = 1, we have that
iii. In j = 2, we have that he problem of the irm is similar to the previous model with the corresponding demand for variety ω.
D.2 Algorithm
his algorithm describes how we compute the steady-state equilbrium. For each city j we have four unknowns: (i) the threshold for the set of products, (ii) the Lagrange multiplier of the budget constraint, (iii) the wage, (iv) and total proits. In the lexible-pricing economy, the equilibrium of each city is solved independently, while in the uniform-pricing economy the eight unknowns are solve simultaneously. Below we describe the extended algorithm to solve the equilibrium. 3. Verify the labor market in each cities and iterate on wages until convergence.
